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5 Towards sustainable infrastructure development through integrated contracts: 
Experiences with inclusiveness in Dutch infrastructure projects 
 
Abstract 
Current complex society necessitates finding inclusive arrangements for 
delivering sustainable road infrastructure integrating design, construction and 
maintenance stages of the project lifecycle. In this article we investigate 
whether linking stages by integrated contracts can lead to more sustainable 
road infrastructure development by assessing public and private experiences 
with inclusiveness of integrated Dutch Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM) 
projects throughout the procurement, design, construction and maintenance and 
operation stages. Through semi-structured interviews and document analysis, 
we find that public and private parties experience that inclusiveness is increased 
by DBFM contracts, although differences between investigated actor, scope 
and time dimensions of inclusiveness exist. We conclude that integrated 
contracts can lead to more sustainable infrastructure development because of 
the lifecycle optimization incentives provided by the linked contract stages of 
design, construction and maintenance. Based on our findings we recommend 
pursuing three avenues towards more sustainable infrastructure development: 
green procurement, strategic asset management and relational contracting. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Over the last decades, projects have become increasingly complex (Williams, 1999), 
which is also recognized in Dutch road infrastructure projects (Arts, 2007). Traditional 
project management approaches cannot account properly for increased complexity in 
the planning arena. ‘Implementation gaps’ (Dunsire, 1978) between stages in the 
lifecycle of projects occur: between government-dominated plan-making, and 
implementation, dominated by the private sector. As a result, planning processes for 
new road infrastructure proceed slowly and regularly come to a standstill and 
completed projects show shortcomings in cost and time overruns (Committee Elverding, 
2008; Flyvbjerg, 2005). In addition to the shortcomings in time and costs of the current 
transport planning process, other challenges are emerging that are related to the 
quality of infrastructure projects: infrastructure delivery is increasingly aimed at 
increasing the specific quality of achieving long-term sustainability. This could be 
realized by increasing the inclusiveness of infrastructure projects, by looking for new 
partnerships (Wakeman, 1997), which transcend traditional economic, social and 
ecological pillars in the Triple Bottom Line of sustainability (Elkington, 1999). 
 
Increased inclusiveness can be found by stressing the linkages, interconnections and 
interdependencies that are inherent to the concept of sustainability (Gibson, 2005). 
Along this line, Arts (2007) proposes to integrate the lifecycle of projects by increasing 
the inclusiveness in the actors, scope and time dimensions. Increasing inclusiveness in the 
actors dimension would mean that government distributes responsibilities to other actors, 
e.g. local stakeholders or consortia of private parties, in such a way that more 
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expertise can be employed. This could better serve the various local and national 
interests, leading to better balanced outcomes with broader public support. By 
increasing inclusiveness in the scope dimension of infrastructure projects, synergies can 
be discovered between infrastructure and their surroundings. These can help to improve 
the overall quality of an area and provide opportunities to arrive at more sustainable 
solutions (Heeres et al., 2012). Inclusion in the time dimension encompasses linking the 
stages in the planning lifecycle. Better coordinated and integrated lifecycle stages 
could enable for a more sustainable planning process and product (i.e. the road 
infrastructure). 
 
In the Netherlands as well as in other European countries, more integral contracts are 
increasingly applied with so-called Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM) lifecycle 
contracts being one important example (Eggers & Startup, 2006). In a DBFM contract, 
a private party is responsible for design, construction, financing and maintenance 
(Hodge et al., 2010; Yescombe, 2007). DBFM contracts are regarded as closely 
related or even similar to Design-Build-Finance-Maintain-Operate (DBFMO) and 
Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) contracts (see Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2006; 
Herrala et al., 2011), because operation usually includes maintenance. These 
integrated contracts that are generally applied in Europe, also show similarities with 
the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) contracts, 
as applied in the United States, in the fact that stages are integrated and the funding is 
a responsibility of the private sector (Pietroforte & Miller, 2002). Specific to the 
application of DBFM contracts in the Netherlands, however, is that maintenance is 
strictly divided from operation. Maintenance can be distributed to market parties in 
DBFM contracts, whereas, operation, the exploitation through network management, 
currently remains a strictly public responsibility (Chao-Duivis, 2011). As a consequence, 
private parties cannot generate income out of the network management (e.g. through 
tolling). Private consortia merely play a role in financing infrastructure in advance and 
earning back their investments by receiving availability payments from government 
during operation. 
 
Integral DBFM contracts have only fairly recently been introduced to road 
infrastructure. Although sometimes difficult to measure because contracts are still in the 
operation stage (Nilsson, 2009) and because there is a lack of data on operating costs 
and outputs (Jensen & Stonecash, 2005), the first projects show possible efficiency 
gains, increased project control and are delivered better in time and within budget as 
compared to traditional contracting (Committee Ruding, 2008; Dutch Ministry of 
Finance, 2010; Klijn, 2009; WB Consulting, 2009). These evaluative studies on DBFM 
projects do only reflect the ‘hard’ outcomes of project management: they give 
indications of time and cost implications. Little is known, however, about the experiences 
of involved public and private stakeholders interacting and cooperating within such 
integrated contracts. Such insights would be valuable because it may uncover directions 
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for improving and streamlining current integrated contracts, which eventually may result 
in (further) time, and cost gains, but also in increased quality of products. 
 
Therefore, the goal of this article is to gain greater insight into current experiences of 
key participants involved in integrated road infrastructure-related DBFM contracts, and, 
more specifically, to explore potential directions for improvement of such contracts. 
Accompanying research questions include: what are current experiences of public and 
private stakeholders involved in integrated contracts regarding current DBFM practice 
and the inclusiveness of such contracts? Which avenues for increasing inclusiveness and 
greater sustainability can be recommended from analyzing linkages between stages in 
Dutch DBFM contracts? To answer these questions we conducted 25 semi-structured in-
depth interviews with Dutch experts that work either for construction companies or for 
the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. Within the interviews we focused on 
inclusiveness in three dimensions, i.e. actors, scope and time, in line with Arts (2007). 
Interviewees were asked about their experiences with integrated (DBFM) contracts on 
these dimensions and about room for improvement. Additionally, we analyzed project 
evaluation studies and other relevant ‘grey’ literature. 
 
The investigation of Dutch practice is relevant to an international audience because, as 
part of the broadly applied neoliberal agenda (England & Ward, 2007) in Western 
countries, contract integration takes place at a broader, international scale. The 
findings and conclusions may therefore be applicable to other Western countries as 
well. In addition, this article relates to the search for ways to incorporate inclusive 
sustainable development into policy and business activities (Labuschagne & Brent, 
2005). The article therefore fits project management after the practice-oriented turn 
(see Blomquist et al., 2010), which shifted the focus to the development of projects' 
processes over time and includes the wider context and its contingencies and 
dependencies (see Engwall, 2003; Söderlund, 2002). 
 
In the remainder of this article, first, we give a background on the development 
towards DBFM contracts, after which we provide the theoretical framework and 
research design. Following that, the issues in stages and linkages of integrated contracts 
are discussed per project stage: procurement and design, construction, and maintenance 
and operation. In the conclusions and discussion section (Section 6), the role of 
inclusiveness and sustainability in the implementation of integrated contracts is 
discussed. Finally, we provide potential ways for increasing sustainability of DBFM 
projects: green procurement, strategic asset management and relational contracting. 
 
5.2 Policy setting: development towards integrated contracts 
5.2.1 Historical overview 
At the end of the 1990s, the new public management ideas (Osborne & Gaebler, 
1992) resulted in a shift across Western governments: a reassessment of government's 
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core competences was necessary (Pollitt et al., 2007) and in a neoliberal agenda of 
privatization more tasks and responsibilities were distributed to the private sector 
(England & Ward, 2007). Executive departments were transformed into agencies: e.g. 
Rijkswaterstaat in the Netherlands and the Highways Agency in the United. Kingdom 
(Highways Agency, 2009; Rijkswaterstaat, 2008). Tasks are transferred because it is 
expected that private contractors are able to identify and develop innovative facilities, 
deliver more quickly and at lower cost, and can provide private funding and operate 
facilities more efficiently (Savas, 2000). In most Western countries the trend towards 
integrated long-term contracts can be recognized (Pietroforte & Miller, 2002) and this 
development is not limited to road infrastructure (see e.g. Chao et al., 2005 on 
integration in the electricity supply sector). 
 
As in many other countries, in the Netherlands government was traditionally responsible 
for plan-making, construction and maintenance of road infrastructure. The rather 
inward-oriented executive department of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment (“Rijkswaterstaat”) controlled the planning procedure from the beginning to 
the end, from agenda-setting and explorative studies to management and maintenance 
of delivered infrastructure (Arts, 2007; Van den Brink, 2009). Until the late 1990s, 
Rijkswaterstaat did so by working out the desired solution in detail in a ‘RAW-bestek’: 
a specification including a detailed technical design with underlying preliminary 
calculation of materials needed and construction time. Based on this estimate, 
contractors could calculate their bids and the lowest bidder was awarded the 
construction contract. After completing construction, maintenance was performed by 
public road districts or contracted out in separate maintenance contracts, which were 
also specified in detail (see Model 1 in Fig. 5.1). 
 




























= potential implementation gap
E&C = Engineering and Construct
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In the Netherlands the neoliberal agenda started with outsourcing maintenance to 
contractors. Specified products and processes were no longer put out to tender, but 
instead performance levels were required by Rijkswaterstaat in so-called performance 
maintenance contracts (see Fig. 5.1, Models 2a/2b). Contractors were allowed more 
freedom to optimize maintenance by applying innovative methods for more efficient 
maintenance. Shortly after, also the approach to the construction of infrastructure was 
revised. Contractors were made responsible for working out technical design 
specifications by establishing Engineering and Construct (E&C) contracts (see Fig. 5.1, 
Model 2a). Positive experiences with E&C contracts paved the way to more inclusive 
Design and Construct (D&C) contracts (see Fig. 5.1, Model 2b). Instead of providing an 
elaborated design in detail, in a D&C contract the contracting authority only requests 
certain outputs to be delivered, based on the general demands and wishes of involved 
public parties. In 2008, D&C contracts became the standard form of contracting within 
Rijkswaterstaat (Rijkswaterstaat, 2008). The next step in the integration of stages in 
infrastructure projects was taken by introducing Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM) 
contracts (see Fig. 5.1, Model 3) in which design and construction tasks are combined 
with performance maintenance over a longer contract period. DBFM contracts are 
currently the standard for complex projects at the national level in the Netherlands, 
and are increasingly applied (see Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1: Closed and proposed contracts (between brackets) for Dutch road infrastructure projects. 
 June 2009 June 2011 August 2012 
RAW 2 (0) 0 0 
Engineering & Construct (E&C) 2 (0) 1 (2) 0 
Design & Construct (D&C) 19 (2) 13 (10) 13 (3) 
Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM)  2  (3) 5 (2) 5 (5) 
 
5.2.2 DBFM contracts 
DBFM contracts aim to integrate over time the stages of design, construction, and 
maintenance into a single arrangement. Financing is also a part of the contract, but is 
arranged for in procurement and plays a role in project control throughout the other 
lifecycle stages. The name of DBFM therefore does not entirely reflect the sequence in 
which the stages and activities take place. Traditionally, design, construction, and 
maintenance stages are separated and poorly integrated, leading to suboptimisations 
(Dorée, 2001). In DBFM contracts, the contractor delivers a service (i.e. availability of 
infrastructure) during a period that can span 15 to 30 years. Through integrated 
contracts, government distributes responsibilities to other actors, e.g. local stakeholders 
or consortia of private parties. Potentially more expertise can be employed, which 
could better serve the various local and national interests, leading to better balanced 
outcomes with broader public support. In DBFM contracts the tasks in design, 
construction and maintenance are transferred from the public client to the private 
contractor. Because government remains client and contracting authority, and, as such 
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remains responsible for strategic planning, DBFM cannot be considered as ‘pure’ 
privatization (Dutch Ministry of Finance, 2010). By extending and broadening the scope 
of infrastructure projects, i.e. including more activities in (parts of) the road network, 
synergies can be discovered between infrastructure and their surroundings, which can 
help to improve the overall quality of an area and provide opportunities to arrive at 
more sustainable solutions (Heeres et al., 2012). 
 
In contrast to Dutch DBFM contracts (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009a), internationally contracts 
often are expanded to DBFMO contracts (see Model ? in Fig. 5.1; Yescombe, 2007), 
which include private operation by tolling, e.g. in Spain, Italy, the Czech Republic and 
Germany (BNP Paribas Fortis, 2010; PS, 2010). Tolling is generally not included in the 
Netherlands because of the historical availability of a good national highway network 
without tolling in the Netherlands, a heavily urbanized country with little available 
space (Lenferink et al., 2012). However, recently three projects with tolling possibilities 
were identified in national policy of 2011: The A15 highway between Ressen and 
Zevenaar, the connection between the A16 and A13 highways and the Blankenburg 
highway tunnel near the harbour of Rotterdam (Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment, 2011). 
 
5.3 Dimensions of inclusiveness: towards a more sustainable planning approach  
Sustainability has been under debate for decades, especially since the UN report ‘Our 
common future’ (WCED, 1987), after which numerous attempts have been made to 
translate sustainability into measurable components. A well-known example is 
Elkington’s concept of the Triple Bottom Line, which proposes three elements of 
sustainable development: social, ecological and economic (Elkington, 1999) that also 
resemble the elements in the people (social), planet (ecological) and profit (economic) 
concept. However, it is difficult to apply these concepts to design, construction and 
maintenance and subsequently assess their performance (Chong et al., 2009). 
Moreover, the definition relies on the traditional economic, ecological and social pillars, 
which causes continuation of traditional thinking and business-as-usual (Gibson, 2005). 
Gibson (2005) therefore proposes to emphasize the linkages, interconnections and 
interdependencies that are at the core of the concept. In Dutch practice, the former 
Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (2002) proposed to 
link the current situation to a broader spatial dimension (“there”) and a time dimension 
(“later”) in order to reach sustainability. Furthermore, Arts (2007) suggests that 
sustainability can be achieved by applying more inclusive planning processes. His 
proposed inclusionary approach includes a shift in the actors, scope and time 
dimensions (Arts, 2007). 
 
The actor dimension comprises the inclusion of actors in the planning, contracting and 
implementation process. It relates to theoretical developments in collaborative planning 
(Healey, 1997) and collaborative alliances (Gray & Wood, 1991), which are reflected 
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in the development from classical to neoclassical contracts (Lyons & Mehta, 1998). 
Classical contracts include as many contingencies as possible in order to reduce the 
possibility of claims and disputes' (Cheung et al., 2006). In Dutch infrastructure planning, 
the previously discussed RAW contracts can be regarded as classical contracts, in which 
the project is carefully hedged (Collingridge, 1983) from outside influences. In contrast 
to classical contracts, neoclassical contracts such as DBFM and D&C consider longer time 
periods, involve more actors and personal interaction and allow for a lower degree of 
discreteness (Lyons & Mehta, 1998).  
 
The scope dimension considers the spatial inclusion of other socio-economic functions in 
road infrastructure development, shifting the project focus from infrastructure itself to 
the combination of infrastructure and the surrounding area (Heeres et al., 2012). This 
expanded focus is necessary because current society is in need of ‘new scales for 
planning intervention’ (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009) in order to deal with problems 
in infrastructure planning. In exploring these new scales, the theoretical concepts of co-
development, in which each involved sector brings their values and expertise (Cervero, 
2009) into the process, in order to come to a ‘mutual gains approach’ (Susskind & 
Cruikshank, 2006). By exploring and extending traditional project boundaries to 
incorporate for opportunities in adjacent sectors, potential synergies could be 
discovered. These could enable a transformation from monofunctional to multi-functional 
development and facilitate more inclusive development (Arts, 2007). 
 
The time dimension reflects the integration of stages in the project lifecycle. Currently, 
stages are separated and poorly integrated (Dorée, 2001), leading to implementation 
gaps (Dunsire, 1978). By connecting stages better, interaction could be realized in 
which knowledge and expertise could be used to better adjust activities to each other 
(Bult-Spiering et al., 2005). These ideas are also reflected in the work on supplier 
integration (Martinsuho & Ahola, 2010) and manufacturing sector life cycle integration 
(Labuschagne & Brent, 2005). Creating opportunities to perform lifecycle optimizations 
could enable to better realize project goals and connect to stakeholders’ interests. In 
doing so, more inclusiveness regarding the time dimension can be realized (Arts, 2007). 
 
In this article we focus on inclusiveness in three dimensions: actors, time and scope. This is 
done partly because a focus on inclusiveness fits within project management’s increasing 
attention to process management (see De Bruijn et al., 2002) and the actuality of 
projects (Cicmil et al., 2006). But, more important, we think that the actor, scope and 
time framework better reflects the collective and transformative character of 
sustainability. Inherent to this perspective on sustainability is an incentive to seek 
relations, as projects are related through their actors, their scope and their 
development over time. 
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5.4 Research design 
In this article we focus on gaining greater insight into current experiences of key 
participants involved in integrated road infrastructure related DBFM contracts in the 
Netherlands. We do this primarily on the basis of information gained from in-depth 
interviews enriched with information from project evaluation studies and other relevant 
‘grey’ literature. Documents analyzed include evaluative studies carried out by the 
Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment and consultancy agencies. The 
evaluations cover the introduction of new contracts, the performance of contractors and 
issues related to inclusiveness. We selected documents that consider Dutch planning 
practice and analyzed them for the actor, scope and time dimension. Subsequently, we 
confronted document analysis findings with the findings from interviews.  
 
Interviews were conducted with actors involved in the implementation of DBFM contracts 
in road infrastructure projects: the A15 highway between Maasvlakte and Vaanplein, 
the Second Coentunnel project, the A12 Utrecht-Veenendaal, the A59 highway 
between Rosmalen and Geffen and the N31 Waldwei. These five project were 
selected because they are the first national level DBFM projects in the ‘growing DBFM 
practice’ in the Netherlands that have completed construction and are currently into the 
maintenance stage. As such these projects can provide insights into the role of 
inclusiveness in all stages included in integrated DBFM contracts. The interviewees 
include public and private legal, financial, planning and management experts in the 
Netherlands (see Appendices 5.1 and 5.2 for an overview) that were selected because 
they work with DBFM projects and reflect a broad range of fields of expertise. They 
usually are involved in multiple DBFM projects, or have sufficient insight in Dutch DBFM 
projects, because of the small, but growing DBFM practice. This allows them to connect 
and relate issues in multiple projects and bring forward learning experiences from the 
perspective of their field of expertise. The majority of the 25 selected interviewees 
works for construction companies or at the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment. In order to gain greater insight into current experiences of key 
participants involved in integrated road infrastructure related DBFM contracts, and, 
more specifically, to explore potential directions for improvement of such contracts, a 
qualitative study seems both relevant and appropriate. The semi-structured interviews 
allow a structured discussion of predetermined issues and developments relating to the 
actor, scope and time dimensions, as well as flexibility for the interviewee to include 
personal experiences and discussion topics (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2005) and the 
possibility for the interviewer to ask clarifying questions and explore issues in-depth. 
Topics addressed related to three dimensions of inclusiveness: actors, scope and time. In 
all dimensions, opportunities and limitations for increasing inclusiveness were explicitly 
discussed (see Table 5.2 for the results).  
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Table 5.2: Effects on sustainability per dimension of inclusiveness in stages of DBFM contracts. 
 
- Regarding the actor dimension, aspects investigated cover cooperation and 
interaction between involved actors, which consist of stakeholders and shareholders 
from government, market and civil society. The topics researched are cooperation 
between public client and private contractor, relations of client and contractor with 
civil society, and relations between the involved project and line organizations.  
- The dimension of scope is operationalised by investigating relations between spatial 
function included in the spatial scope and adjacent spatial functions in the 
surroundings at the project level. In infrastructure projects, proposed and existing 
spatial functions are brought together, for example housing, nature and mobility.  
- Discussed topics in the time dimension are relations between contract stages over 
time, and the way these are integrated and information is exchanged. This includes 
relations between the infrastructure included in the project and the infrastructure 
network at a higher level. 
Stage Inclusiveness 
dimension 




Actors Cooperation within consortia;  
Broader, socially relevant 
award criteria. 
Closed non-participative character 
of procurement; Renewal of public 
participation after procurement 
difficult. 
Scope Integrated synergetic designs; 
Area-oriented, context-
sensitive award criteria. 
Limited design freedom due to 
detailed legal character of 
procurement. 
Time Life-cycle perspective in 
designs and bids: life-cycle 
costing. 
Detailed, extensive, complex 
contract; Difficult to define 
sustainability upfront. 
Construction Actors Construction aimed at 
minimizing nuisance. 
Stage closed to public parties 
(except procuring authority). 
Scope Added value is realized, 
synergies may be created. 
Interdependences may result in 
time and cost overruns. 
Time Freedom to include quality-
based long-term maintenance 
considerations in construction. 
Traditional task distribution 
prevails: activities split up into 




Actors More attention to 
maintenance actors in earlier 
stages. 
New actors involved have to deal 
with previously closed detailed 
agreements. 
Scope Context-sensitive maintenance 
strategy. 
Tension between specific contract 
and general tasks of asset mana-
gement tasks at network-level. 
Time Life-cycle management 
applied. 
Difficult to measure performance; 
Operation disconnected from 
project lifecycle. 
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One can see that dimensions are connected and possibly overlap, which is essential for 
an inclusiveness perspective on sustainability. For example, spatial claims (scope) are 
negotiated between stake- and shareholders (actors) in order to adjust construction and 
maintenance activities (time) to each other.  
 
The section on Dutch practice (Section 5.5) is structured to fit the analysis of inclusiveness 
dimensions discussed above: findings with regard to actor, scope and time dimensions 
are grouped along different stages of integrated contracts: design and procurement, 
construction, and maintenance and operation. These stages represent parts of the 
project life cycle for which a range of similar names exist in international project 
management (Labuschagne & Brent, 2005; Ward & Chapman, 1995). Procurement is 
also included because it plays an essential role in the setup of DBFM contracts. Also 
procurement activities are closely linked to design activities and because procurement is 
often performed simultaneous with design. The discussion of the maintenance stage is 
combined with operation, because these activities are related and performed 
simultaneously. 
 
Financing is not a part of the discussion of the DBFM contract stages in the next section, 
because financing is not a separate stage, but plays a role throughout procurement, 
design, and maintenance stages. In addition, in Dutch DBFM contracts government is the 
primary responsible party for funding the infrastructure. There is no opportunity for 
private parties to fund the infrastructure and subsequently generate income in the 
operation stage, for example through tolling. The included Finance component in Dutch 
DBFM contracts therefore merely services as an incentive to guarantee private actors 
performance. Private parties finance the infrastructure in advance and have to lend 
from banks or other financial institutions. The private parties are paid back by the 
contracting authority on the basis of their performance. A common way of measuring 
performance is road availability during construction and maintenance (Eggers & 
Startup, 2006). If a private party performs well in construction and maintenance, it 
eventually gets repaid the pre-financed sum plus interest and a profit during the course 
of the contract. The interviewees indicated that including the Finance component can 
help to offer business opportunities to the private sector to materialize efficiency gains 
in DBFM projects. In the experience of public and private parties it can also assist in 
developing a more businesslike perspective on road infrastructure investments: banks or 
institutional investors that act as financiers aim to secure investments and therefore 
closely control project performance (see also Dutch Ministry of Finance, 2003; Eversdijk 
& Korsten, 2008). 
 
5.5 Practice: Integrated contracts in the Netherlands 
In this section, for each stage investigated, design and procurement (Section 5.5.1), 
construction (Section 5.5.2), and maintenance and operation (Section 5.5.3) first a 
general description of the character of each stage will be given, which includes issues 
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related to linking to previous stages. For example, the discussion of the construction 
stage also covers the link with previous design and procurement stages. Afterwards, for 
each stage dimensions of inclusiveness will be discussed for different stages of DBFM 
projects: first based on document analysis, secondly on interviews and illustrated by 
quotes. 
 
5.5.1 Design & procurement 
In design and procurement stages of DBFM projects, inclusiveness and sustainability 
become visible in the way government’s wishes and ambitions are translated into 
procurement preconditions and awarding criteria. Designing road infrastructure is a 
major part of the preparatory activities and largely determines the manner of 
construction, maintenance and operation. Procurement implies political decisions to be 
made beforehand on project’s objectives, constraints and requirements. To make such 
decisions, the public planning procedure attempts to rationally limit uncertainties in the 
project, contract and procedure by applying hedging (Collingridge, 1983). Public 
authorities gather data and work out alternatives until a desired level of certainty is 
reached (Committee Elverding, 2008), and request detailed bids from private parties 
in procurement, when projects are published in the Official Journal of the European 
Union. Examples of regulations and guidelines that channel this demand for detail are 
the guidelines for applying the competitive dialogue procurement procedure 
(Nagelkerke et al., 2009), which is usually performed for Dutch DBFM projects, and the 
standard DBFM contract (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009a).  
 
Issues in the design stage of DBFM contracts are strongly related to the link with the 
stage of procurement. In order to secure a contract, private consortia work out designs 
in detail in the procurement (WB Consulting, 2009), although only outputs are 
requested (see Section 5.2). This enables a better judgment of practicalities and risks 
involved in the proposed solution, so that a better bid can be made. Analysis of 
practice reveals that this overzealous attitude of the management of consortia increases 
transaction costs in procurement. Almost all respondents from the procuring agencies 
and from industry see this factor as attributing to increased transaction costs. 
“Overzealous questions from project organizations in long tender processes can help 
define competitive offers, but they can also make us go too deep, increasing costs” 
(private director tender division). Therefore to secure a contract in procurement, private 
parties have to do part of the design before the contracting. Performing private design 
activities before the contract is closed can lead to innovation, time gains and more 
business-like, ‘grounded’ bids (Lenferink et al., 2012). However, private parties indicate 
that design activities that remain after award of the contract are limited and can be 
similar to the engineering component in E&C contracts: making a technical specification 
on basis of a selected, worked-out design. 
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Actor dimension 
Regarding the actor dimension the rather closed character of procurement, as 
described above, provides difficulties for cooperation between contractors and 
procuring authorities and for involving civil groups. Lenferink et al. (2012) mention this 
is inherent to the closed and confidential character of procurement. In contrast to public 
planning procedures where the public is formally involved, in procurement procedures 
the public is generally not involved or only involved limitedly. Nooteboom (2006) states 
that a hedged, bounded space for negotiation is created that acts as a safe 
environment for negotiating solutions and contracts. In procurement, a development 
towards broader, socially relevant awarding can be recognized by evaluating bids on 
price and quality through applying MEAT criteria (Most Economically Advantageous 
Tender, a requirement when applying the competitive dialogue procurement procedure, 
see EC, 2004) and experimenting with awarding on the basis of value and 
cooperation.  
 
The interviewees indicate that it is difficult to hedge of procurement in practice. A 
public planning manager states that it is difficult to “keep local politicians and civil 
groups silent and at ease during this part of the process”, because of their limited 
involvement. The public can feel excluded during a closed and confidential procurement 
procedure, which can fuel opposition to the implementation of the project. Public 
procuring authorities indicate that it is difficult to re-involve the local stakeholders in the 
project when procurement is successfully completed with a contract awarded. 
Experiences with MEAT criteria are obtained in the DBFM project of the A12 highway 
between Utrecht and Veenendaal in which corporate social responsibility is included as 
one of the qualification and awarding criteria and civil groups are actively involved in 
judging the bids (see also Rijkswaterstaat, 2009b). The interviewees indicate that 
MEAT-criteria opened up possibilities for more cooperation with civil society. In 
addition, they mention that steps are currently undertaken to introduce more flexible 
ways of procurement, such as making interviews with key experts from private 
contractors a part of the awarding criteria. 
 
Scope dimension 
Lenferink et al. (2010) describe the trend to hedge the planning and procurement 
process by detailed public planning procedures and a strict legalistic attitude towards 
the actors involved in planning and procurement procedures. Numerous procedural 
standards are involved, such as the DBFM standard contract (Chao-Duivis, 2011; 
Rijkswaterstaat, 2009a) and the competitive dialogue standard (Nagelkerke et al., 
2009), which can restrict the flexibility regarding the scope in design and procurement. 
Compared to traditional contracts, contractors are supposed to have more freedom to 
specify the solution in DBFM contracts, because of area-oriented, context-sensitive 
award criteria. Such award criteria are, for example, applied in the project of the A12 
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between Utrecht and Veenendaal, in which preventing traffic and environmental 
nuisance during construction and maintenance is one of the award criteria.  
 
The interviewees indicate that context-sensitive award criteria applied in procuring 
DBFM projects can be regarded as an example of the increased attention to the 
relation between a project and its surroundings. They acknowledge that the project aim 
partly determines the flexibility for inclusiveness in the scope dimension. If the 
connection between functions is actively sought in a broader scope, more stakes are 
involved, which subsequently increases transaction costs. In line with Lenferink et al. 
(2010; 2012), the public and private interviewees mention for example that the D&C 
contract for the A2 Maastricht project (with tunnel and urban redevelopment) is aimed 
at optimizing project quality and will provide the freedom to design multi-use solutions, 
while the DBFM projects of the Second Coentunnel and the A15 highway corridor 
between Maasvlakte and Vaanplein are aimed at project control, and the D&C project 
of the N31 between Zurich and Harlingen D&C project is aimed at achieving time 
gains. Although the interviewees feel that the standards for procuring DBFM projects 
can be useful in promoting efficiency at the organizational level, they can also restrict 
flexibility regarding the scope at the project level: “over-specified procurement results 




In the time dimension of inclusiveness ties between design and procurement help in 
identifying possibilities to streamline processes. By involving the market parties in both 
these activities, time gains can be achieved as procedures are adjusted to each other, if 
the start of the procurement is timed properly. Lenferink et al. (2012) found that if 
market parties are approached early in the process, political uncertainties can make a 
project too risky for market parties to become involved in. On the other hand, if 
procurement is started late in relation to planning and design, political decision-making 
will have narrowed opportunities for market parties to effectively deal with technical-
spatial issues in the project.  
 
The interviewees mention that an inclusive perspective on the time dimension is 
introduced in designs and bids as life-cycle costing plays a role. In the Second 
Coentunnel DBFM project, for example, contractors were required to conform to ISO 
15288 standards, which is a systems engineering standard covering processes and 
lifecycle stages. The interviewees regard such systems as helpful, because they 
stimulate a lifecycle perspective. However, the interviewees are aware that systems 
engineering can be applied too rigidly, which does not fit the inclusive character of 
sustainability. Sustainability is difficult to define upfront and translate into performance 
targets: “the fuzzy character of sustainability can make it lose ground to other factors 
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The construction stage in a Dutch DBFM project has remained fairly similar to traditional 
contracted projects. In this stage, the contract has been awarded, the planning 
procedures have been completed and the political decisions have been taken. The 
private (sub) contractor constructs the infrastructure as specified in the contract and the 
public authority supervises the private activities. 
 
Linking construction to earlier design and procurement stages is not new. As explained 
in Section 5.2, there is considerable experience with D&C contracts. The danger of 
linking design and construction in a contract is that these activities become a black box 
for government, as they are no longer prepared or performed by government. Public 
and private parties acknowledge this as an issue because “loss of expertise in design 
and construction can lead to a decrease in capability to judge quality of bids and 
guide following stages” (public contract manager). This issue also is recognized in 
practice in the US (GAO, 2008) and in the UK, where it is related to the concept of 
intelligent customer (NAO, 2011). Ultimately, the loss of knowledge could affect the 
capacity of government to fulfil its responsibilities in infrastructure delivery and in 
safeguarding environmental quality. A solution is hiring external experts to judge the 
bids, but this increases transaction costs. 
  
Actor Dimension 
With regard to the actor dimension, room for cooperation exists in the construction 
stage of DBFM. Van den Brink (2009) describes how Rijkswaterstaat transforms from an 
inward to an outward-oriented organization: it delegates responsibilities to contractors, 
which requires them to change their roles and attitudes. Private contractors can stand 
out by improving their relationship with the environment, which is also applied in the 
USA and the UK (Ernzen & Woods, 2001; Harding et al., 2007). However, there is a 
common interest in consortia to prevent overoptimistic designs and cost and time 
estimates, as can occur if mainly public actors are involved (Flyvbjerg, 2005), because 
profit and survival of consortia are at stake. In addition, private consortia increasingly 
consist of the same combination of companies, which helps in quickly setting up efficient 
private–private cooperation.  
 
Although there is considerable experience with linking design to construction in 
integrated contracts (see Section 5.2.1), the interviewees indicate that the link requires 
attention to prevent miscommunication and misinterpretation between actors involved in 
design and construction. Private consortia need “time and effort to assemble a team of 
designers and constructors and adjust their methods of working to each other, and to 
the project” (private director tender division). Interviewees from the private parties 
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mention that, in the A12 Utrecht-Veenendaal DBFM project, they have to explain how 
they involve residents and interest groups during the construction and maintenance 
stages. They feel that this attention to the relation with the environment helps in raising 
public awareness and thereby limits the number of complaints. Involved local actors can 
use their expertise to positively influence the project performance. For example, 
“involved municipalities in DBFM projects traditionally put more effort into the 
landscaping as they have to deal with local interests” (public stakeholder manager). 
 
Scope Dimension 
Regarding the scope dimension, DBFM projects differ from traditional construction 
because they include a more flexible construction stage. More room is given to create 
smart, optimized spatial designs for the road and its surroundings, which has proven to 
be one of the most important innovations accomplished in the previous procurement 
stage (Lenferink et al., 2012). More significance is given in designs to landscaping and 
mitigation, which results in more possibilities in the scope dimension of construction. 
Heeres et al. (2012) describe how smart ways to handle the connections of the project 
with the environment are sought through which road infrastructure projects are 
becoming more area-oriented. The interests included in a broader scope can be real 
estate, housing or nature development.  
 
The interviewees regard area-oriented planning as a positive development. In the 
DBFM projects of the A12 between Utrecht and Veenendaal and the A15 between 
Maasvlakte and Vaanplein, for example, this is applied in practice by focusing on 
minimizing nuisance for road users and people living in the vicinity of the project during 
construction. This “stimulates synergies in the project between the included interests” 
(public purchasing manager) and provides private contractors with possibilities to earn 
back investments. A potential issue that is recognized by the interviewees is the created 
interdependencies by the integrated character of DBFM projects. Small problems in one 
part of a project can cause delays in other parts of the project and possibly a 
complete standstill of a project: “such interdependencies in a DBFM contract can make 
a delay cause additional delays” (public stakeholder manager). 
 
Time Dimension 
DBFM contracts include more freedom for contractors in construction. Because only 
outputs are specified, contractors are free to select and choose construction methods, 
materials and planning. Construction can therefore be organized in a manner suited to 
contractors’ qualities and adjusted to earlier and later stages. By doing this, also the 
responsibility for the project is continued after the construction stage. This changes the 
relations between private construction companies and causes the formation of consortia 
(Gruneberg & Hughes, 2006). 
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The interviewees experience the changed character of projects and the lifecycle 
linkages that play a role in construction. In the past, time and costs were most important, 
but now “different considerations play a role in construction, such as constructability, 
maintainability, and environmental quality” (private director tender division). However, 
they feel that the characters and activities of consortium partners currently participating 
in DBFM contracts do not fundamentally change. The awarded DBFM contract is split up 
within consortia in separate parts for construction and maintenance, and distributed to 
the partners that are specialized in these activities. Therefore, life-cycle optimizations 
are mainly generated in design and procurement, and play only a limited role after 
these stages have been completed. 
 
5.5.3 Maintenance & operation 
In DBFM projects, during maintenance the contractor is made responsible for 
maintaining infrastructure for a certain period, usually between 15 and 30 years. The 
activities and investments of the private consortia are compensated for on the basis of 
quality of service, defined as the required availability of the road. The consortium 
borrows money from private financiers to finance construction and maintenance. Over 
the span of the maintenance stage in the contract, government pays availability fees to 
the contractor, the height of which depends on its performance. The fees can be 
adjusted for factors that negatively influence availability, such as time overruns in 
construction or extra lane closures for maintenance. 
 
Linking construction and maintenance is uncommon in Dutch infrastructure planning and 
therefore requires considerable effort. In the past, interests in maintenance were 
subordinate to construction. This led to conflicts between public contracting authority 
and private client involved in construction on the one hand, and the public maintainer on 
the other. However, by integrating the contract and making one consortium responsible 
for construction and maintenance, “interests are aligned and collaboration is 
stimulated” (private project director). Nevertheless, contrasts between large, national 




Aforementioned contrasts between maintenance and construction companies can 
provide challenges in the actor dimension. The interaction and data exchange between 
actors from the later stages of management and operation and earlier stages can 
prove to be difficult. For example, the Dutch Ministry of Finance (2010) mentions that 
availability fees require up-front specifications of the services to be delivered and a 
reliable monitoring system. If data to determine these fees is available, it is subject to a 
great margin of uncertainty due to the time span of the contract and the complexity of 
society. As a consequence it is difficult to assess liability under the contract terms, which 
can obstruct inclusion of private actors in operation and maintenance. Therefore, in the 
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DBFM projects for N31 Waldwei and the A59 between Rosmalen and Geffen, issues 
such as slipperiness control and incident management are performed by government 
(Buck Consultants, 2004). 
 
The interviewees feel that expertise could be combined by involving different groups 
from different stages: “existing differences in the working styles of involved private 
parties can even help in keeping parties sharp and alert” (private project director), 
which could possibly lead to better results. However, the public and private actors that 
become involved in maintenance and operation of DBFM projects mention that they 
have to deal with contracts and agreements that were reached in earlier stages. They 
feel that they are “not involved in the actual discussions and negotiations that have laid 
the basis for the contract” (private operations supervisor). The interviewees agree that 
the performance of maintenance is subject to external factors and therefore difficult to 
measure and manage. Examples mentioned by interviewees are the ecological quality 
of verges that has proven to be difficult to measure, and that weather conditions can 
influence the growth of grass between driving lanes and can make it necessary to mow 
them more often. 
 
Scope dimension 
For successful lifecycle optimizations in DBFM projects, it is essential to clearly delimit 
project boundaries by defining an optimal period for the maintenance stage and the 
geographical extension of the network under consideration. Determining the span of the 
contract is essential for the effectiveness of this incentive. Bult-Spiering et al. (2005) 
describe that longer term contracts, with longer maintenance stages, include major 
overhaul maintenance as well as minor, periodical maintenance, and therefore play a 
role in determining the optimal maintenance strategy - introducing a lifecycle 
management approach. However, such longer contracts decrease flexibility as it 
becomes more difficult to switch contractors when new developments require it (Buck 
Consultants, 2004). Currently, however, only relatively small parts of the road network 
are contracted out through DBFM contracts. The small size of the A59 DBFM project, for 
example, limited profitability of maintenance and caused the public party to take 
control of some management tasks (Habets, 2010). 
 
Interviewees from the public organizations indicate that, during maintenance, strategic 
organizational issues will play a role, in which it can be difficult to distinguish between 
temporal tasks to be included in the scope of the project and other tasks that are part 
of the strategic organization of the road network. With increasing application of DBFM 
contracts, more maintenance of parts of the road network is delegated to private 
parties, resulting in a fragmented picture. From an asset management point of view, 
integration over projects stages can be outbalanced by disintegration of network 
management. An interviewee mentions that “[it can be more profitable to] manage the 
complete road network instead of locking-up parts of the network in DBFM contracts, in 
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DBFM contracts offer possibilities for applying lifecycle optimizations in construction 
and maintenance, which traditionally had to be laid down in separate warranty 
regulations for construction and for maintenance. As Bult-Spiering et al. (2005) and Van 
Garsse et al. (2009) recognize balancing maintenance and construction costs can lead 
to optimizations over the total project lifecycle. However, DBFM contracts are often set 
up in detail (see Section 5.1) and there are no strong incentives to increase the 
adaptability and resilience of project elements. For public parties, contractual long-
term commitment to a private partner can restrict options for new strategic plan-
making, as for instance also recognized in Belgian DBFM practice (see Van Garsse et 
al., 2009), and can create tensions with operation activities, such as dynamic traffic 
flow management. Different parties are responsible for maintaining (private) and 
operating (public) infrastructure, with different objectives and primary goals. 
 
Interviewees experience tensions between maintenance and operation, partly as a 
result of excluding operation from Dutch DBFM contracts. While maintenance aims at 
quality of infrastructure, operation at quality and quantity of transport. They feel that 
the two tasks need to be continuously coordinated, which lead to detailed regulations 
and contracts that negatively affect the room for flexibility and the possibilities to 
increase sustainability. In addition, changes will occur over time and limitations with 
respect to the scope and adaptability of DBFM contracts will make themselves felt: by 
the end of the maintenance period the infrastructure will differ significantly from the 
project as laid down in the contract. For example, an interviewee mentions that “due to 
rapid developments in the field of electronic installations and dynamic traffic flow 
management, existing techniques might outdate quickly” (public contract manager). 
However, interviewees generally feel that these possible disadvantages can be 
outweighed by advantages of integrating several stages in a contract: “a consortium 
can reduce maintenance costs by adjusting the construction and perform lifecycle 
optimizations in the design” (public technical manager). 
 
5.6 Conclusions and discussion: towards inclusiveness in DBFM contracts 
In the previous section issues in various stages of integrated projects were discussed, 
which can limit or enhance inclusiveness as it becomes clear from the analysis displayed 
in Table 5.2. This table shows how the experiences with regard to inclusiveness 
dimensions of actors, scope and time, can positively or negatively affect the 
sustainability. These positive and negative experiences are grouped according to the 
stages of the DBFM contracts, discussed in the previous section. 
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5.6.1 Conclusions: sustainable life-cycle integration in contracts 
On the basis of the experiences in practice, we can conclude that the extent to which 
DBFM contracts can contribute to more inclusive Dutch road infrastructure projects 
depends on how the stages of DBFM contracts are integrated and how the public and 
private actors involved deal with the three dimensions of inclusiveness (see also Table 
2). With regard to the first research question (‘What are current experiences of public 
and private stakeholders involved in integrated contracts regarding current DBFM 
practice and the inclusiveness of such contracts?’), we find that public and private 
experiences with lifecycle integration in DBFM projects are positive: linkages included in 
the contract enable lifecycle optimization as procurement and design, construction and 
maintenance are adjusted to each other. However, the interviewees also bring forward 
critics and limitations of DBFM projects in the investigated actor, scope and time 
dimensions, which illustrate that there is still considerable room for improvement of 
project management to come to more inclusive infrastructure development. 
 
With regard to the actor dimension, it can be concluded that the integration of stages 
in DBFM contracts improves relations between actors because interests are aligned with 
a shared common goal within the contract and consortium. However, the closed 
character of procurement can obstruct the involvement of public and local government, 
also in later stages. The broader socially relevant award criteria set in procurement can 
help improve inclusiveness in the actor dimension of a project’s design, construction and 
maintenance by facilitating relations between government, market parties and civil 
society. In the scope dimension, DBFM stimulates integrated designs and can help 
achieve sustainable synergies. However, this might be obstructed in practice by 
detailed inflexible procurement, which limits freedom in adjusting scope. Furthermore, in 
later operation and maintenance stages tensions between the tasks and the 
responsibilities included in the project and the wider network oriented asset 
management tasks can emerge. Context-sensitive award criteria, designs and 
maintenance strategies can help strengthen the relation between infrastructure and the 
surrounding environment. Regarding the time dimension, DBFM contracts prove to 
enhance interaction between stages. Integrated DBFM contracts can lead to more 
inclusiveness through lifecycle optimizations, inspired by lifecycle costing in procurement 
and lifecycle management in later stages. However, interviewees bring forward issues 
that arise in defining desired performance rigidly at an early stage and measuring it 
afterwards. In addition, in Dutch integrated DBFM projects, operation is disconnected 
from the other stages, thereby limiting the incentive to perform lifecycle optimizations 
that relate to operation of infrastructure and connect to plan-making and help to deal 
with the interfaces between infrastructure project and infrastructure network. 
 
All-in-all, although this article was limited to a study of the 'growing practice' of 
integrated DBFM contracts in Dutch infrastructure development, it can be concluded that 
integrating stages of road transport infrastructure projects seems a logical step 
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towards sustainable performance in the lifecycle, which can be facilitated by DBFM 
contracts. The framework with three dimensions of inclusiveness provides a relevant 
addition to evaluative research on road infrastructure contracts, which is mainly based 
on project outcomes (see Hodge & Greve, 2009) and technically measurable 
sustainability of delivered products. A drawback of the framework can perhaps be its 
multiple interpretations in practice. However, the inclusiveness dimensions investigated 
allow a broad practical insight in the public and private experiences in DBFM contracts, 
which reflects the broad and multi-faceted concept of sustainability. These insights are 
relevant to project management, as they connect to the discussion on the practice-
oriented turn in project management (see Cicmil et al., 2006; Söderlund, 2002) in which 
processes, experiences and actions in practice receive increased attention. Perhaps the 
most important contribution to this discussion is that the experiences brought forward in 
this article show the essential relation between a project and its environment, be it civil 
society (actor dimension), functions that can contribute to area-oriented and context-
sensitive solutions (scope dimension), or the operating network of which a project is part 
of (time dimension). Project managers should aim at improving the relation with this 
environment, because it can result in more inclusive and sustainable projects. 
  
5.6.2 Recommendations: strategies for improving inclusiveness and sustainability 
Based on the insights provided in this article, we can make several recommendations in 
order to answer the second research question (‘Which avenues for increasing 
inclusiveness and greater sustainability can be recommended from analyzing linkages 
between stages in Dutch DBFM contracts?’). We recommend pursuing three promising 
avenues for project management research to further increase inclusiveness: green 
procurement, strategic asset management and relational contracting. 
 
The first avenue of green procurement relates to the time dimension. Green 
procurement is defined as guaranteeing and encouraging sustainable construction in the 
processes of drawing up contracts (Russel, 1998). By determining sustainable 
qualification, award and contract performance criteria that link the early plan 
development and design activities in public plan-making to the design activities in 
contract implementation, green procurement can provide private market parties with 
public wishes and ambitions for later stages that exceed standard project 
preconditions. Green procurement is applied in several countries: in Canada as green 
procurement (PWGSC, 2006) and in the USA as environmentally preferable purchasing 
or green purchasing (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). Although the 
development and application of MEAT criteria in European project practice can be 
seen as a first step along this avenue, it could be recommended to further investigate 
the relation between green procurement and integrated DBFM contracts in project 
management. Interesting developments along this line are sustainability measurement 
systems such as the CO2 performance ladder, LEED, BREEAM, and CEEQUAL (see for an 
overview Arts & Faith-Ell, 2012). The CO2 performance ladder, originally developed 
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by Dutch railway agency ProRail (ProRail, 2010), assesses the working processes of 
potential contractors and subcontractors. These organizations can become certified at 
certain sustainability levels in order to get a discount on their bids. The instrument is 
comparable to BREEAM and CEEQUAL, applied in the United Kingdom, and the LEED 
system, applied in US construction industry (Arts & Faith-Ell, 2012). 
 
The second avenue relates to the scope dimension and involves a reconsideration of the 
relationship between DBFM contracts, at the project level, and asset management, at 
the network level. Strategic asset management is ‘a business process and a decision-
making framework that covers an extended time horizon, draws from economics as well 
as engineering, and considers a broad range of assets’ (FHWA, 2011). By effectively 
linking back from asset management and traffic management in the maintenance and 
operation stages to the policy-making and plan-making stages, the lifecycle can be 
completed. However, a simple implementation of a neo-liberal agenda of transferring 
tasks and responsibilities from public to private sector will generally not suffice. It can 
be recommended to investigate to what extent applying strategic asset management in 
project management would involve a redefinition of the role of government and market 
parties. 
 
A third avenue relates to the actor dimension and involves the recognition that 
neoclassical discrete contracts, like DBFM, may not sufficiently adapt to changing 
circumstances because they are aimed at completeness (Williamson, 1979). Long-term 
contracts have to account for that by incorporating open-ended terms, which leave a 
margin for variation or complete renegotiation of commitments. Efficient contracting 
must therefore be cooperative and based on trust, not on obligations specified in 
advance (Campbell & Harris, 2005). Introducing relational contracts could make 
project management more adaptive and resilient in order to cope with complexity and 
bridge implementation gaps. Relational contracts enable parties to create unique, 
interdependent relationships between public and private actors, which are suitable for 
complex projects (Cheung et al., 2006; Turner & Simister, 2001), because they help 
improve relationships and smoothen difficulties in the transaction (Rahman & 
Kumaraswamy, 2008). It could be worthwhile to investigate if the introduction of 
arrangements such as partnering, strategic alliancing, project alliancing and joint 
ventures (see Chan et al., 2010) can help to improve project management of 
integrated contracts. 
 
This article has provided more insight into the ‘black box’ of the DBFM contract, which 
could be used to improve its application. Eventually these public and private 
experiences could help provide insight into the processes and practices that contribute 
to the DBFM outputs in terms of risks, costs and quality. This research is limited to Dutch 
DBFM contracts, while in practice, more types of public private arrangements exist that 
can offer inclusiveness and sustainability through lifecycle optimizations, and practice 
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can differ across countries. Such other practices can include other set-ups of DBFM 
contract components (especially the Finance-component differs across countries), other 
types of contracts such as DBFMO or alliances, and other roles and structures for public 
and private parties in infrastructure project management. Further research could be 
aimed to include and compare such experiences with other contracts and from other 
countries, which could possibly help project management practice in the transition 
towards inclusive and more sustainable infrastructure development. 
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Appendix 5.1: Interviewed experts per field of expertise. 
 Management Planning Technical/Financial Legal Total 
Public 3 3 6 3 15 
Private 4 1 1 0 6 
Other 1 1 1 1 4 
Total 8 5 8 4 25 
 
Appendix 5.2: Dutch and international experts interviewed. 










  1 Contract manager, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
2 Contract manager, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
3 Manager back office, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
4 Purchasing manager, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
5 Contract manager, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
6 Legal advisor, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
7 Planning stakeholder manager, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
8 Legal advisor, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
9 Planning stakeholder manager, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
 10 Legal advisor, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
 11 Contract manager, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
 12 Project director, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
 13 Alliance manager, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 
 14 Technical manager, Dutch Department of Infrastructure & the Environment 











) 16 Director Tender Division, large construction firm 
17 Senior project adviser, large construction firm 
18 Project director, large construction consortium 
19 Operations supervisor, large construction firm 
20 Director Tender Division, large construction firm 
21 Director Tender Division, large construction firm 
22 Transport and Traffic advisor, large Dutch engineering firm 






s 24 Dutch Professor Construction law, Lawyer in construction & procurement law 
25 Associate Professor in Construction Engineering and Management, USA 
